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This thesis was originally developed in coordination with the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) as an effort to further the Unmanned Tactical 
Autonomous Control and Collaboration (UTACC) program. Ultimately, MCWL did not 
fund continuing thesis research, so this thesis continued under the funding, and oversight 
of the Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research 
(CRUSER). However, it remains important to understand the UTACC program to 
understand the objectives of this thesis. Additionally, MCWL has remained engaged in 
tracking the progress of this thesis, and will be provided a copy of the finished report.  
UTACC is a system of systems approach designed to develop the necessary human-
machine teaming that could reduce the cognitive load on the warfighter (Roth & Buckler, 
2016). As of 2016, MCWL’s efforts have focused on intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR), and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) 
missions (Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 2016). Ultimately, UTACC was designed to 
leverage autonomous unmanned vehicles (UxVs) in a manner that increased the 
warfighter’s effectiveness while it decreased the cognitive demands.   
The original MCWL tasking was to find a quick-win robotic system that could 
immediately have a positive impact on a particular set of Marine Corps missions. 
Identifying this quick win involved conducting an abbreviated analysis of alternatives 
(AoA) designed to identify systems that were mature, and ready to field. Based on this 
goal, the authors focused on systems that were a technology readiness level (TRL) seven, 
or higher. There are nine total TRLs, and TRL seven is defined as a system prototype 
demonstrated in an operational environment (Defense Acquisition University, 2017). The 
authors chose to focus on this level because it was best positioned to rapidly leverage 
mature technologies that had not been widely identified by the Marine Corps, or the 
Department of Defense (DoD) at large. The authors also investigated systems less than 
TRL seven, but showed potential to be a quick-win system.   
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A. AREAS OF CONSIDERATION 
Three separate topics serve as a framework for defining the problem space. First, it 
covers the operating environment which is designed to lay out how the authors see these 
quick-win systems fitting into the Marine Corps based on the Future Operating 
Environment (FOE), taken from the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC). Second, it 
reviews the priorities that the Marine Corps Rapid Capabilities Office (MCRCO) uses to 
prioritize acquiring new technologies into its portfolio. Last, it relates the DoD acquisition 
process to this thesis.    
1. The Operating Environment 
The MOC lays the foundation for how Marine Corp forces will operate over a broad 
range of military operations while meeting the guidelines of Title 10 (Headquarters United 
States Marine Corps, 2016). With an ever-changing operating environment, identifying 
what could lead to changes in the way Marines are trained, organized, and equipped is 
important. The MOC identified the following causes for change in the FOE: complex 
terrain, technology proliferation, information as a weapon, a battle of signatures, and an 
increasingly contested maritime domain (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2016). 
Complex terrain introduces information and human aspects to those of the traditional 
geophysical aspects (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2016). The enemy learned 
that they can use complex terrain to reduce the impact of the Marine Corps technological 
advantage. Technology Proliferation is the enemy’s ability to gain a tactical advantage 
through the use of anti-access/area denial capabilities, and other tactics to reduce the 
Marine Corps’ strategic reach and operational freedom of maneuver (Headquarters United 
States Marine Corps, 2016). With the ability to utilize 3D printers and obtain commercial-
off-the-shelf products, adversaries acquire technology at a much faster rate, making it 
critical to identify and procure advanced technologies more quickly. Information as a 
weapon is critical to today’s operating environment given that so much information flows 
continuously over the internet. Navigating the network in order to gain knowledge and 
perception is imperative, while also protecting friendly networks (Headquarters United 
States Marine Corps, 2016). Battle Signatures will allow the enemy to locate and target 
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friendly forces; additionally, the Marine Corps must acquire the technology to detect 
enemy signatures (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2016). Increasingly 
Contested Maritime Domain entails the enemy’s ability to challenge friendly forces’ 
control of the sea and limit access to certain regions. These driving forces will quickly and 
drastically alter the environment in which the Marine Corps operates. This, coupled with 
the quickly evolving technology of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned 
ground vehicles (UGVs), necessitates the continuous exploration and implementation of 
these technologies in order to bridge the gaps. 
2. The Marine Corps’ Rapid Capabilities Office Priorities 
The MCRCO’s mission is to “…implement a capability development mechanism 
that will harness operational experience, and creativity by providing a pathway to rapidly 
develop, and deliver operational prototypes, and emerging capabilities to begin assessing 
their value in exercise, and experimental settings more quickly than current processes 
support” (The Marine Corps Rapid Capabilities Office, 2016, p. 4). This helps the Marine 
Corps identify the same quick-win systems as this thesis. Accordingly, the authors included 
several of the key thresholds used by the MCRCO in order to better align the output of this 
thesis with its goals. One of the first thresholds was that initiatives should be less than 
$13.5 million (The Marine Corps Rapid Capabilities Office, 2016). The authors have used 
this amount as an order of magnitude for cost estimation and not a detailed cost estimate. 
A lack of time and resources limited the authors’ ability to accurately estimate costs for the 
evaluated systems; instead this thesis collected an order of magnitude estimate for each 
system. The next identified requirement from the MCRCO is that sustainment be 
“…minimal; limited to Contractor Logistic Support” (The Marine Corps Rapid 
Capabilities Office, 2016, p. 5). The final threshold identified as critical to this thesis from 
the MCRCO is that the timeline for procurement be less than one year (The Marine Corps 
Rapid Capabilities Office, 2016, p. 5). This threshold indirectly informs the requirement of 
specific TRLs in the systems being analyzed. As stated previously, the authors used TRL 
level seven as the bench mark for systems to ensure rapid fielding if selected. Although 
additional thresholds have been identified by the MCRCO, these relate more closely to 
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requirements on funding sources and risk analysis that are specific to the MCRCO, and not 
this thesis. 
3. The DoD Acquisition Process 
The traditional DoD acquisition process has a well-defined structure and body of 
laws that govern its implementation. By design, this process is deliberate and slow 
preventing the adoption of new technologies in DoD agencies rapidly. Other methods are 
well suited and fully established for the rapid acquisition of new technologies, or platforms. 
The authors believe that the majority of these platforms are compatible with Other 
Transaction Agreements (OTAs). Title 10 U.S.C. 2371B allows for transactions including 
prototypes used for testing, evaluation, demonstration, or low-rate production (McMartin, 
2018). This method has been widely used and successful since 2016. A smaller body of 
law surrounds the 2371B than the Federal Acquisition Regulation that governs the 
traditional acquisition process, making it well suited for the rapid acquisition of new 
technologies (McMartin, 2018). While not a workaround for traditional contracts, this type 
of OTA is how the authors recommend acquiring the platforms identified in this thesis. The 
OTAs would provide for the quick fielding of a platform, but not necessarily the full 
operational capability of a long-term program designed to support that platform over the 
duration of its life cycle. 
B. PLATFORMS 
This section covers both types of UxVs that the authors investigated during this 
research: UAVs and UGVs.   
1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  
The development of UAVs has largely been pushed forward by military 
applications (Fahlstrom & Gleason, 2012). UAVs, remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), and 
drones are all aircraft which by definition do not require pilots.  For the purpose of this 
paper we will be using UAVs in regards to all three systems.  While an RPV may be a 
UAV, a UAV is not always an RPV because it has the potential to operate autonomously 
or on preplanned missions.  RPVs are controlled from a remote location.  A basic UAV 
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system is made up of an air vehicle, a ground control station, and data link as seen in 
Figure 1 (Fahlstrom & Gleason, 2012).  
Figure 1.  Generic UAV system. Source: Fahlstrom and Gleason (2012). 
Beyond the three elements that make up a UAV system identified above, the model 
may be expanded.  A more detailed model includes the “…unmanned aircraft, human 
element, payload, control elements, and data link communication architecture” (Barnhart, 
Hottman, Marshall, & Shappee, 2011, p. 43). Additionally, a military UAV should have 
the added elements of weapon systems and supported soldiers (Barnhart et al., 2011).  




Figure 2.  Elements of an unmanned aircraft system. Adapted from 
Barnhart et al. (2011). 
The first element to make up the UAV system is the unmanned aircraft itself. These 
vehicles fly without a human on board and can be broken down into three categories: fixed-
wing, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL), and lighter-than-air (LTA) (Barnhart et al., 
2011). Fixed-wing UAVs have many of the same components as a normal manned aircraft. 
The benefits of fixed-wing UAVs include longer flight duration, increased time on station, 
increased range of operations, and the ability to complete missions at higher altitudes 
(Barnhart et al., 2011). The disadvantages include an increased logistical requirement, to 
include an area from which to takeoff or launch (Barnhart et al., 2011). VTOL aircraft 
come in different configurations such as helicopters, fixed-wing aircrafts that can hover, 
and tilt-rotors (Barnhart et al., 2011). The advantages of a VTOL aircraft include a reduced 
logistical requirement for takeoff and recovery, and the ability to hover in a small area, 
reducing the amount of airspace required to operate (Barnhart et al., 2011). LTA aircraft 
are categorized as either a conventional or hybrid airship (Assistant Secretary of Defense 
















gas to provide static buoyancy, while hybrid airships use a combination of static lift, hull 
shape and dynamic lift such as thrusters (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering, 2012). The DoD separates UAVs into five distinct categories summarized in 
Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  DoD UAS categories. Source: Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering (2012). 
Command and control is a crucial element in regards to UAVs. A wide array of 
possibilities from no autonomy to full autonomy exist, where the aircraft would be able 
operate on its own from takeoff to landing (Barnhart et al., 2011). Regardless of the 
capabilities of the autonomous software, UAVs have an autopilot system which will aide 
in the flight of the aircraft. The autopilot uses an electronic control system and feedback 
loops to affect the UAV flight path, attitude, altitude, and airspeed (Fahlstrom & Gleason, 
2012). Another element of command and control is the Ground Control Station (GCS). 
These stations may be land or sea based, and facilitate human control of the systems 
(Barnhart et al., 2011).   
The communication data link is the element of a UAV that transmits information 
between itself and the GCS and autopilot (Barnhart et al., 2011). This function may be 
categorized as either radio frequency line-of-sight (LOS), or beyond line-of-sight (BLOS). 
A UAV using LOS is being controlled via radio waves, limiting the range of operations 
(Barnhart et al., 2011). BLOS utilizes satellite communications, or relay vehicles in order 
to control the vehicles, increasing the range of operations. However, a disadvantage is the 
time delay between the controls and the system (Barnhart et al., 2011).   
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The utilization of the attached payload allows UAVs to complete their assigned 
mission. There are numerous types of payloads, and the UAV may be configured 
accordingly for missions such as surveillance, weapons delivery, communications, aerial 
sensing, or cargo (Barnhart et al., 2011). It is possible for UAVs to carry more than one 
payload to increase its’ mission set. Payload weight deserves careful consideration in 
designing UAVs as well as the  ability to switch out payloads to increase interoperability 
(Barnhart et al., 2011). 
There are numerous methods to launch and recover UAVs, all requiring a different 
amount of equipment, logistical support, and space to operate. Popular approaches for 
taking off include catapult systems, both pyrotechnic or pneumatic and hydraulic, rotary 
wing vertical take offs, and hand-launched systems (Fahlstrom & Gleason,  2012). There 
are multiple retrieval options for recovering UAVs. If a fixed-wing UAV needs to land in 
a small space it is common for nets, arresting gear, parachutes, or para-foils to be used in 
order to decrease the required area for recovery (Fahlstrom & Gleason,  2012). 
The last element of the model which is crucial to UAV operations is the human 
element. Considering the state of robotics at this time the human must be involved with the 
operation, however, the machine is able to take on some of the responsibilities previously 
held by the human (Barnhart et al., 2011). As technology advances the responsibility of the 
human will also decrease. It is this reduction of the human requirements and increasing 
interdependence that is important to the UTACC model (Rice, Chhabra, & Kiem, 2015).  
2. Unmanned Ground Vehicles 
UGVs are systems that travel across the ground in order to move something other 
than a human being, often times completing what are considered dirty and dangerous jobs 
with its payload, referred to as effectors (Gage, 1995). UGVs operate on a similar model 
to that of the UAVs, consisting of command and control, communication data link, human 
element, payload, and launch and recovery element. Similar to UAVs, UGVs may be 
operated autonomously, or remotely, but the biggest difference in classification is based 
upon the mobility platform or type of locomotion (Khurshid & Hong Bing-rong, 2004). A 
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UGV can be one or combination of the three locomotion platforms: artificial rotational 
devices, legs, or articulated bodies (Hirose, 1991). 
Artificial rotational devices encompass both wheels and crawler tracks, and are not 
efficient in adapting to the current terrain (Hirose, 1991). Their efficiency on flat ground 
and mechanical simplicity make them valuable to some organizations. The efficiency, 
quickness of the robot, simplicity to build, and simple control system provide many 
advantages compared to  other platform configurations (Khurshid & Hong Bing-rong, 
2004). 
Utilizing  legs for locomotion improves the UGVs ability to handle diverse terrains 
(Khurshid & Hong Bing-rong, 2004). There is much debate on the optimal number of legs 
for an UGV, however legs provide three benefits. The first benefit is that the legs may act 
as a rest for the platform while not moving, providing stability on uneven terrain for use of 
the effectors (Hirose, 1991). The next benefit is that legs touch the terrain at arbitrary 
points, making them ideal to handle uneven terrain (Hirose, 1991). The last benefit is that 
the legs’ ground contact area may be configured as large as necessary to support the UGV, 
and with joints the UGV may switch directions more quickly (Hirose, 1991). 
The articulated body robot is made up of multiple segments, connected linearly 
(Hirose, 1991). By coordinating the motion of its segments, the UGV may pass uneven 
terrain, narrow paths, cross ditches, and marshes (Hirose, 1991). Another benefit is that it 
is easily transportable because of the ability to split the UGV into multiple segments, which 
also raises one of the disadvantages of reliability and maintainability due to individual 
segment failures (Hirose, 1991). 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed how the sponsors and MCWL chose the topic and how it 
changed once MCWL was no longer formally involved. The chapter also discusses the 
areas that helped to determine the path for this research effort: the operating environment, 
priorities of the MCRCO, and how the DoD acquisitions process relates to this thesis. Last, 









II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review covers three sections. The first section summarizes the work 
completed under the Unmanned Tactical Autonomous Control, and Collaboration 
(UTACC) program.  This section includes both previous theses and additional robotics 
programs undertaken by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL).  The second 
section of this chapter covers key concepts under the UTACC program and their relation 
to this thesis.  Finally, the chapter concludes by reviewing the relevant doctrine associated 
with the two selected key mission tasks: local security and targeting.   
A. WORK DONE TO DATE 
This section covers the work done to date under the UTACC program as well as 
other robotic efforts completed, or ongoing with MCWL that is relevant to this thesis.  
1. UTACC 
Nine theses have been completed as a part of UTACC and an additional four theses 
are ongoing. These theses have been selected through coordination between MCWL and 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in order to align the efforts of both organizations. 
The first thesis developed a concept of operations (CONOPS) (Rice et al., 2015). The 
second thesis conducted a vulnerability and threat analysis of the UTACC program (Batson 
& Wimmer, 2015). The third thesis examined the concept of interdependence in human-
machine teaming (Zach, 2016). The fourth thesis proposed specific measures of 
performance and measures of effectiveness for MCWL’s use (Kirkpatrick & Rushing, 
2016). The fifth thesis was an AoA for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (Roth & 
Buckler, 2016). The sixth thesis developed a campaign of experimentation (Larreur, 
2016).  The seventh thesis examined situational awareness at the small unit level (Beierl & 
Tschirley, 2017). The eighth thesis sought to identify suitable interfaces for the UTACC 
program and the requirements that should be used for future development (Kulisz & Sharp, 
2017). The ninth thesis identified interdependence requirements for a human-machine team 
for a specific immediate action drill (Wilcox & Chenoweth, 2017). As of September 2018, 
there were four theses ongoing, including this one. The other three theses are an additional 
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AoA focusing on sub-systems, one further studying situational awareness, and one 
studying cognitive load.   
These theses introduced important concepts to the authors that were relevant to the 
study. In the CONOPs thesis two important concepts emerged: first, humans should have 
input into the autonomous process and second,  explicit feedback loops will allow the UxS 
systems to pair with humans (Rice et al., 2015). This thesis also introduced the concept of 
modularity, which provides the system with the potential to be configured multiple ways 
in order to meet a specific mission (Rice et al., 2015). The vulnerability and threat 
assessment thesis provided useful information about both technical and non-technical 
security controls which should be included in the design of a system, such as extensive 
training with the operational unit and remote zeroing capabilities (Batson & Wimmer, 
2015). The coactive design thesis was beneficial to the authors because it introduced the 
concept of interdependence between humans and machines, while working as a team to 
finish tasks (Zach, 2016). 
2. Other MCWL Robotic Efforts 
The following MCWL projects are reviewed to understand MCWL’s research 
direction and goals. This list is not all-inclusive and has no ordinal ranking.  
The Robot Vehicle Modular (RV(M)) is an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) 
designed for small units (squad and below) and has a payload that is highly modular 
(Marine Corps Warfighting Lab [MCWL],2016). This modularity was designed to rapidly 
adapt the vehicle in order to best support a unit’s current mission. The RV(M) supports an 
Expeditionary Landing Team by providing a multiuse ground  platform that is MV-22 
transportable (MCWL,2016).   
The Picatinny Pallet is a UAV designed to provide autonomous aerial resupply to 
maneuver units in urban, or other complex environments (MCWL,2016). This capability 
allows small maneuver units to carry less equipment, or supplies with them and instead 
rely on an aerial resupply if required. This concept gives flexibility to dismounted 
maneuver units and allows for rapid resupply in contested environments.  
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The Intuitive Robotic Operator Control (IROC) provides more intuitive controls 
and less complex interfaces to control UxVs (MCWL,2016). This program leverages new 
advances in human system interfaces, including voice or haptic concepts of control.  
Squad X, primarily sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), empowers platoons to conduct distributed maneuver while maintaining the 
ability to mass effects when required (MCWL,2016). In theory, Squad X is enabled through 
the effective collaboration, or human-machine teaming that includes both UAVs and 
UGVs.  
The Tactical Robot Controller is a collaborative effort with the United States 
Marine Corps (USMC), the United States Navy, and the United States Army to develop a 
single controller capable of controlling multiple unmanned assets in order to lighten the 
warfighter’s load and reduce the number of systems that require training  (MCWL,2016). 
This single controller would reduce the logistical support required across the USMC and 
could be used for a multitude of missions to include intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR), and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA). 
B. KEY CONCEPTS 
1. Autonomy  
The Department of Defense (DoD) and the USMC seek to leverage autonomous 
technologies through investment in research and development. UTACC was initially one 
of these endeavors that thought it would rely on the concept of autonomy to achieve its 
goals of integrating human and machine teams more closely. That is no longer true.   
It is important to first define and differentiate autonomy from the related concept 
of automation. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines 
autonomy as an unmanned system’s “…own ability of sensing, perceiving, analyzing, 
communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting to achieve its goals as assigned by 
its human operator(s) through designed [human-robot interaction] HRI” (National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, 2004b, p. 8). Automation involves a finite amount of 
predefined responses to some action where a machine can conduct the task better, faster, 
or cheaper (Johnson, 2014). 
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Many fields working with autonomous systems have developed some variation of 
an ordinal list defining the levels of autonomy used to rank individual systems (Bradshaw, 
Hoffman, Johnson, & Woods, 2013). Scholars at the Institute for Human and Machine 
Cognition (IHMC) argued this is not helpful as one particular system may be less 
autonomous than another, but not necessarily less valuable (Bradshaw et al., 2013). They 
referenced the Defense Science Board’s (DSB) recommendation to abandon the debate 
over levels of autonomy. Their first argument was that functional differences in work are 
important (Bradshaw et al., 2013). This refers to the differences in an individual task, or a 
joint task. For example, the task of conducting an analysis of thousands of data points may 
be assigned to a particular system. There is no cooperation between the system and other 
systems (human, or machine), so it will accomplish the task independently. However, the 
task of interpreting and acting upon the results of the prior data analysis may be assigned 
to a human-machine team (joint task). In this case, there would be dynamic interaction 
between the machine system and the human. A predefined level of autonomy in this 
scenario would not be useful in explaining the capabilities and limitations of a particular 
system.   
The second argument the IHMC scholars made was that levels are not consistently 
ordinal and that machines may be highly self-directed, but not highly self-sufficient 
(Bradshaw et al., 2013). These authors indicated that it is not always possible to say that 
one particular characteristic of an autonomous system is “lower”, or “higher” in its level 
of autonomy (Bradshaw et al., 2013). The idea that self-directedness may differ greatly 
from self-sufficiency is transferable to the acquisition of new technologies. As with any 
organization, the DoD consistently must make decisions to limit the scope, or capabilities 
of a new system in order to meet deadlines and budget requirements. It is not likely that 
the future autonomous systems the DoD fields will be both highly self-directed and highly 
self-sufficient; this reality means that a single assigned level of autonomy would not be 




Interdependence is a common element in any team and is critical to the UTACC 
program. As autonomous systems are becoming more common, the degree to which these 
systems work with humans will become increasingly important. Dr. Matthew Johnson 
(2014), a robotics research scientist in human-machine teaming, argued the importance of 
understanding interdependence when dealing with human and machine teaming. His work 
on interdependence crossed several fields of study including organizational studies, social 
psychology, and linguistics. He first identified three categories of interdependence: pooled, 
sequential, and reciprocal. Dr. Johnson states that these categories are “…relevant for 
human machine-design but insufficient…” and further identifies two overarching types of 
interdependence: required (hard) and opportunistic (soft) (Johnson, 2014, p. 25).  
Required interdependence is a complete level of dependence of other team 
members in order to be successful. Opportunistic interdependence comes from the team 
members’ recognition that there are opportunities for higher levels of effectiveness, 
efficiency and a more robust set of options through teamwork (Johnson, 2014). This 
concept is critical to future efforts by the DoD to develop robotics that team with humans 
instead of the common one-way interactions. The understanding of interdependence led 
Dr. Johnson and his fellow researchers to develop the concept of coactive design. Figure 4 




Figure 4.  Interdependence model. Adapted from Johnson (2014).  
3. Coactive Design 
Coactive Design is a process in which a system is designed to allow for teamwork 
through support for interdependence (Johnson, 2014). Coactive design is how 
interdependence is baked into the design of a system. UTACC seeks to instill this concept 
in the design of future systems to facilitate human-machine teaming. Coactive design is 
unique in its focus on interdependencies; in the UTACC program these interdependencies 
exist between the human and the machine. Because coactive design focuses on 
interdependencies involved with tasks, it has the potential to create more capable and 
flexible systems. This process provides a clear example of why levels of autonomy are not 
helpful. For example, which of the following two systems would be qualified as better, or 
more autonomous: one requiring no human intervention and completing the assigned task 
correctly 60% of the time, or a second system requiring periodic human intervention and 
completing the task correctly 95% of the time?  Either system could be labeled as more 
appropriate depending on what the user required.  
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4. Observability, Predictability, and Directability  
When determining how to ensure coactive design is being implemented correctly, 
engineers need to understand several core principles of interdependence. Supporting the 
interdependence of a team requires mutual observability, predictability, and directability 
(OPD), differentiating a joint activity from an individual activity (Johnson, Bradshaw, 
Hoffman, Feltovich, & Woods, 2014). OPD allows UTACC researchers to understand to 
what degree systems will interact and what potential they have to adapt to one another. 
Team members must be capable of observing what the other members are doing as well as 
predicting what they will do in particular situations. Finally, each member must be capable 
of directing the other members of the team. It is this directability that allows human-
machine teams to take full advantage of the capabilities of each member. When examining 
OPD, it is important to note that the directionality between the human and machine is not 
important. The human needs to be capable of directing the machine just as much as the 
machine must be capable of directing the human. The same goes for observability and 
predictability. Machine to machine relationships must also exercise OPD. OPD is therefore 
not a characteristic of a human-machine team exclusively, but rather characteristics of any 
team that is interdependent. 
5. Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) make up the CIA triad. This triad 
explains the three objectives of security practices in different information domains. NIST 
defined computer security as “The protection afforded to an automated information system 
in order to attain the applicable objectives of preserving the integrity, availability, and 
confidentiality of information system resources” (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 1995, p. 5).   
Confidentiality “assures that private, or confidential information is not made 
available, or disclosed to unauthorized individuals” (Stallings, 2011, p. 43). In a UTACC 
scenario, confidentiality focuses on the ability of the system to assure that enemy forces 
cannot access the data while in transit, in process, or at rest. If any unauthorized user were 
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to gain access to the information that was protected, this would be a loss of confidentiality 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004a).          
Integrity is the assurance that information is only altered in an authorized manner 
by an authorized user (Stallings, 2011). In a UTACC scenario, integrity would be the 
assurance that no enemy forces, or unauthorized users were able to change, or manipulate 
the data while in transit, in process, or at rest. If an unauthorized user was able to access 
the information and change it, this would be a loss of integrity (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2004a). 
Availability is the assurance that a system is working and able to provide the 
required services when authorized users require them (Stallings, 2011). In a UTACC 
scenario, availability would focus on the ability of authorized users to gain and maintain 
access to required services throughout the duration of a mission. If the users lost access, 
this would be considered a loss of availability (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2004a).      
6. Situational Awareness 
In June of 2017, Captains Beierl and Tschirley completed a thesis that examined 
situational awareness in the human-machine team construct. Their work identified what 
situational awareness may look like inside a human-machine team (a USMC infantry fire 
team in this instance). They identified shared mental models and a common language as 
key drivers in the successful integration of humans and machines toward an effective and 
shared situational awareness. Beierl and Tschirley suggested that these key drivers will be 
developed between humans and machines in the same way as humans develop them; 
through extensive training. The concept that machines will need to train with Marines is 
critical to the development and acquisition of future unmanned systems. If these concepts 
are not included in the system requirements developed by DoD agencies, industry will not 
build machines capable of teaming with humans, or will do so in a suboptimal manner. 
UTACC must leverage this information as it looks to prototype new technologies and move 
into procurement.       
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Another source of critical information for the future building of systems 
requirements will be the ongoing study by Lieutenant Colonel Alan Clark and Major Daniel 
Knudson of the Naval Postgraduate School that is focused on the concept of cognitive load. 
This study aims to develop the future requirements the DoD should utilize in the acquisition 
of new unmanned and autonomous systems while taking the effects of cognitive load into 
account. 
7. Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) 
With the influx of new and improved technologies there has been an increased use 
of unmanned vehicles. With the increased use of sensory systems to include cameras, radar, 
LIDAR, and acoustic sensors onboard UxVs, there has been a need to reduce the SWaP of 
the systems (Jones & Gross, 2014). UTACC has experienced limitations imposed by SWaP 
with some of its robotic testing platforms. It is through this struggle that UTACC has 
recognized the importance of finding the balance within the SWaP equation. The 
requirements for new technology that incorporate devices with multiple capabilities into 
one to reduce SWaP is growing. Smaller UxVs increase transportability, reduce payload, 
fuel requirements, cost, and detection (Jones & Gross, 2014). Overall, it is the increased 
use of UxVs and their range of missions that is driving the requirements to reduce the 
SWaP in these systems. 
The authors identified a gap in the literature and doctrine that is worth noting. While 
the DoD has laid out categories for UAVs (Groups 1–5) based on size, altitude, and speed, 
there is no clear definition of categories for UGVs (Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering, 2012). Likely, this is due to the difference in current capabilities 
between UAVs and UGVs; UAVs do not deal with some of the major obstacles that UGVs 
must such as navigation of changing terrain and obstacles. A clear method for categorizing 
UGVs has not been developed. The authors see this as a gap that must be addressed as the 
DoD looks to incorporate more UGVs into operations. A category-based delineation of 
UGV types would allow for ease of communication and a shared understanding between 
industry and the DoD. 
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8. Modularity  
With the increasing utilization of UxVs for multiple mission sets, it is necessary to 
utilize systems that are modular. Modularity is the ability to switch payloads of a system 
in order to change the functionality of the system to align with a specific mission it is about 
to conduct (Canning, 2005). With the increased use of UAVs and UGVs, payloads and 
systems need to be produced as modules so that it is possible to share components between 
platforms. Modularity allows for the military to invest in standard system frames and then 
configure them modularly with different payloads to accomplish each mission (Canning, 
2005). 
C. DESCRIPTION OF MISSIONS 
This thesis was assigned to look at four missions for the UTACC concept: a quick-
reaction force (QRF), targeting, local security, and ambush detection. In order to ensure 
the topic was properly scoped, the authors chose to focus on targeting and local security. 
These two mission sets were clearly defined in official publications, allowing for a clearly 
defined set of requirements. Targeting and local security also offered the best opportunities 
for autonomous systems to have an impact based off current research and development.  
1. Local Security 
Navy Tactical Task (NTA) 6 defines protecting the force as “To protect the tactical 
forces fighting potential so that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place” (Chief 
of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, & Headquarters United States 
Coast Guard, 2007, p. 151). Further, it defines protecting individuals and systems as “To 
use protective positions, measures, or equipment to reduce the effects of enemy and 
friendly weapon systems, and to enhance force effectiveness” (p. 151). This thesis 
combined these two definitions to create an overarching definition for local security; to use 
protective positions, measures, or equipment “…to protect the tactical forces’ fighting 
potential so that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place” (Chief of Naval 
Operations et al., 2007, p. 151).  
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This definition of local security will be used to evaluate systems at the tactical and 
operational levels of war. NTA 6 has three subsections that further detail what is required 
in protecting the force: NTA 6.1 Enhance Survivability, NTA 6.2 Rescue and Recover, and 
NTA 6.3 Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means (Chief of Naval Operations 
et al., 2007).   
NTA 6.1, Enhance Survivability, is designed into “personnel, equipment, ships, 
aircraft, supplies, areas, and installations” (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007, p. 151). 
In reference to local security, enhancing survivability is directly applicable to the smallest 
units such as a fire team conducting local security while on patrol. Additionally, enhancing 
survivability can be understood as the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) protecting the 
forward operating base (FOB) where it is conducting flight operations. Inside both of these 
examples, the opportunities to enhance survivability extends to areas such as logistics. If 
the logistical burden of resupply is shifted by an autonomous platform, it would be 
considered enhancing survivability by not requiring friendly units to expose themselves to 
enemy fire to gain needed supplies.     
NTA 6.2, is defined as “…rescue and recover military and civilian personnel, 
equipment, and systems” (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007, p. 154). As a part of local 
security, rescue and recovery operations are planned and resourced at the operational level, 
and then executed by tactical units. Based on the Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC), 
it is possible that tactical units will be required to launch recovery operations from an 
Expeditionary Advanced Based (EAB) in the future (Headquarters United States Marine 
Corps, 2016). This requirement would place specific demands on unmanned and 
autonomous systems; modularity of sensors and payloads and the ability to operate 
securely inside the CIA framework will be critical to success in a contested environment. 
NTA 6.3, Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means, enhances “...freedom 
of action by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or 
surprise” (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007, p. 156). “This task includes actions for 
protecting and securing the flanks and rear area of operational formations, and protecting 
and securing critical installations, facilities and systems. It also includes protection of 
harbors, ports, and installations against acts, which may undermine the effectiveness of 
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friendly forces” (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007, p. 156). In addition to NTA 6.1 
and 6.2, NTA 6.3 is a broad subsection of protecting the force that covers many applicable 
areas for local security such as establishing area security, protecting critical facilities and 
systems, protecting lines of communication, conducting surveillance, and assisting in law 
enforcement operations (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007). 
2. Targeting 
Targeting, for the purpose of this thesis, is defined as “the process of selecting and 
prioritizing targets in the physical domain and matching the appropriate response to them, 
taking into account operational requirements and capabilities” (Chief of Naval Operations 
et al., 2007, p. 278). Minimizing risk, time, and resource expenditure is vital in today’s 
operational environment as the decision-making cycles are occurring in condensed 
timelines and financial constraints are impacting commanders’ options. Autonomous 
targeting systems have the potential to minimize risk and reduce decision-making cycles 
and resource expenditure.  
Targeting conducted by an autonomous system would utilize the same Decide, 
Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A) process as is described in Marine Corps Task (MCT) 
3.1, Conduct Targeting (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007). There are six subtasks 
described in MCT 3.1: “(1) Receiving commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent, (2) 
Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization, (3) Capabilities analysis, 
(4) Obtain the commander’s decision and force assignment, (5) Mission planning and force 
execution, and (6) Combat assessment” (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007, p. 278). 
These subsections of MCT 3.1 are explained below in order to understand the detailed 
requirements that inform the analysis of an autonomous targeting system designed to 
reduce the cognitive load of the warfighter. These subsections were used to determine the 
overall mission capability of the evaluated systems. No subsections are considered required 
for a system to be evaluated, or defined as a suitable candidate for a “quick win.” 
MCT 3.1.1, receiving the commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent is designed 
to “...support the national strategies/desired end state for the conduct of military actions, 
while the guidance provided with the objectives stipulates particular conditions related to 
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the execution of operations (e.g., limitations on collateral damage)” (Chief of Naval 
Operations et al., 2007, p. 279). A subsection of this task is effects-based targeting. Effects-
based targeting involves operations that produce specific effects based on the commander’s 
intent, while considering all available resources, and minimizing risk, time, and resources 
expended (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007). An autonomous system would need to 
be capable of matching the available resources to the target that best achieves the 
commander’s objective. This would involve some level of situational awareness on the part 
of the system, which could be developed organically, or pushed to the system. It is this 
subsection of MCT 3.1.1, effects-based targeting, that would be advantageous if present in 
the capability set of an autonomous system.  Figure 5 shows the D3A process as described 
in MCT 3.1.  
 
Figure 5.  D3A process model. Source: Chief of Naval Operations et al. (2007). 
MCT 3.1.2, target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization, 
encompasses target development operations (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007). These 
operations evaluate “exploitable vulnerabilities and provide validation as to whether a 
target is lawfully viable,” and subsequently prioritize the targets based upon the 
commander’s guidance (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007, p. 280). This component 
of targeting has potential for autonomous systems. The prioritization of targets in 
accordance with the commander’s guidance could quickly be accomplished in a dynamic 
environment by an autonomous system (Defense Science Board, 2012).   
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MCT 3.1.3, the capabilities analysis, is used to “determine the most promising 
forces for application against targets, estimating the effects of lethal, or non-lethal attacks 
against specific targets, and the physical, functional and psychological vulnerability of the 
target” (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007, p. 284). On a dynamic battlefield, the 
number and types of friendly forces combatant commanders have access to changes rapidly 
and it can become difficult to ensure that a capability analysis is current. There is potential 
for an autonomous system to assist in the dynamic recalculating of a capability analysis.   
MCT 3.1.4, obtaining the commander’s decision and force assignment, involves 
receipt of the commander’s decisions based on the previous three subsections of targeting, 
MCT 3.1.1-3. This is a critical step in the flow of information, but will not have a 
significant impact on the analysis of potential autonomous targeting systems.  
MCT 3.1.5, conducting mission planning and force execution, is the comprehensive 
development of fire support and distributing of the subsequent target information (Chief of 
Naval Operations et al., 2007). The degree to which this task is assigned to an autonomous 
system, a human team, or mixture is highly variable. Elements of planning are well suited 
for machines, while other parts are reserved for the human decision-maker.  
MCT 3.1.6, the combat assessment, is the final action within MCT 3.1. This step 
involves conducting the battle damage and munitions effects assessments in order to 
determine re-attack recommendations (Chief of Naval Operations et al., 2007). Multiple 
sensors and rapid computational analysis make this particular task well suited for an 
autonomous system to assist DoD organizations.  
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter highlighted the importance of key concepts such as autonomy, 
interdependence, coactive design, OPD, situational awareness, and SWaP. Doctrine was 
used to formalize definitions for the two mission tasks selected. Additionally, the doctrine 




III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The authors used the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) to inform the 
development of the research methodology used in this thesis. Based on the DAU’s 
recommendations concerning an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), four sections are 
included in this chapter. First, an explanation of the process of an AoA and the categories 
the authors selected for this thesis. Second, the chapter includes a section on the scope of 
this thesis. Third, the chapter presents the actual analysis framework that was used to 
evaluate the unmanned vehicles (UxVs). Last, a section is included that covers the 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) that were used when evaluating the UxVs.     
A. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
This thesis used the outline for an AoA proposed by the DAU. In the guidebook, 
DAU describes an AoA as, “an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, 
suitability, and life-cycle cost of alternatives that satisfy established capability needs” 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2017, p. 105). While the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory’s (MCWL) original statement of work did not explicitly reference an AoA, the 
framework provided by the AoA study plan served as an appropriate analytical foundation 
for evaluating a large number of systems. Because of both the intent of the thesis and its 
limited resources, the authors did not utilize the entire AoA outline proposed by the DAU 
guidebook. Instead, the authors chose which sections to use for the development of a 
methodology that would allow for a comprehensive review of the technology field in the 
given time frame.   
The introduction of the study plan, including the background, purpose, and scope 
are covered in this chapter and Chapter I. The ground rules, including the environment and 
limitations, constraints, and assumptions, also appear there. The alternatives and measures 
of effectiveness categories are explained in this chapter and the results for these two 
categories are presented in Chapter IV. All other sections, seen in Figure 6 were not 
evaluated.    
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The AoA study plan proposed by the DAU calls for a comprehensive review of the 
tradeoffs (cost, schedule, and performance) for each alternative considered (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2017). As a part of a holistic review process, a traditional AoA 
would involve considerable simulation and testing of all alternatives to determine the 
performance parameters for each system. Given time and resource constraints, however, 
this thesis uses five measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to evaluate the systems, in addition 
to the systems’ size, weight, and power (SWaP) characteristics. Figure 6, the DAU 
proposed AoA study plan, includes main sections of an introduction, ground rules, 
alternatives, determination of effectiveness measures, effectiveness analysis, cost analysis, 
cost effectiveness comparisons, and organization and management (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2017). The DAU study plan is not designed to be a strict checklist for all 
analyses, rather a guide for any DoD acquisition program to tailor for its specific needs. 
Not all of the sections, or subsections will be included in this thesis due to constraints, or 




Figure 6.  DAU Proposed AoA study plan. Adapted from Defense Acquisition 
University (2017).  
B. STUDY SCOPE 
The authors identified the associated constraints, limitations, and assumptions that 
determined the scope of the thesis. The constraints are a “restriction imposed by the study 
sponsor that limits the study team’s options in conducting the study” (United States Army 
TRADOC Analysis Center, 2012, p. 6). The limitations are “an inability of the study team 
to fully meet the study objectives, or fully investigate the study issues” (United States Army 
TRADOC Analysis Center, 2012, p. 6). The assumptions are any “statement related to the 
study that is taken as true in the absence of facts, often to accommodate a limitation” 
(United States Army TRADOC Analysis Center, 2012, p. 6). The requirement to make 
evaluations based on technical specifications, site visits, and limited demonstrations 




The authors identified two broad constraints that would have an impact on the 
systems identified and the evaluation process for those systems. First, the authors selected 
two mission tasks as the focus for this thesis: local security and targeting. These two tasks 
limited the scope to a manageable size, but also limited the types of systems that qualified 
for evaluation.      
The second constraint was a short timeline in which the evaluations could be 
conducted. The authors submitted the thesis proposal and it was returned in August of 
2017. This left the authors with only one year to build the requisite knowledge, identify 
systems, conduct the evaluation, and write the thesis.      
2. Limitations 
The authors identified three limitations during this thesis. First, the authors were 
unable to conduct a cost analysis, risk analysis, or sensitivity analysis. These analyses 
require extensive resources and time that the authors did not have. Additionally, these 
analyses work most efficiently when there is a baseline alternative, or problem set to 
compare against. This thesis is not designed to find a suitable alternative to an existing 
system, or concept, rather to identify possible systems that could be quickly integrated and 
provide a tangible benefit to the Marine Corps.        
Second, the need to make decisions based on external technical specifications from 
the sourcing companies, site visits, limited demonstrations, and attendance at the 
Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) Exponential 2018 
limited the scope. Due to a lack of experience and technical expertise in the field, the 
authors were not able to independently verify the statements made by companies regarding 
their systems. The AUVSI Exponential 2018, the most significant source of data collection 
for this thesis, is a large and comprehensive trade show for unmanned and robotic systems 
that takes places each year.     
Third, the data collection was limited to attendance at the AUVSI Exponential 
2018, direct contact with the sourcing companies and site visits. The authors first identified 
possible systems through online searching; one of the biggest contributors was the website 
 
29 
http://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com. From this site, the authors made direct 
contact with companies to request information. Additionally, the authors used professional 
connections through the Naval Postgraduate School’s Information Sciences Department to 
identify possible systems.      
3. Assumptions 
The authors identified six distinct assumptions in the process of writing this thesis 
that affected the evaluation of systems. First, the authors interpreted the concept of a “quick 
win” as referring to a system that could be fully fielded in less than two years. The Marine 
Corps Rapid Capabilities Office (MCRCO) has identified a one-year timeline for their 
efforts in accelerated capability development (The Marine Corps Rapid Capabilities Office, 
2016). The authors added one year to this concept to account for emerging technologies 
that may have been close to mainstream adoption. Second, the authors determined that 
systems being developed by partner nations may be considered for evaluation, as this is 
done in the DoD acquisitions process. Third, the authors assumed that the systems 
evaluated could operate at both the tactical and operational levels of war. This means that 
the evaluated systems could be implemented at the fire team level, or as a part of 
Expeditionary Advanced Base (EAB) operations, or any level in between.   
The fourth assumption was that the effectiveness analysis explained later in this 
chapter would provide the Marine Corps with sufficient information to make an informed 
decision. The goal was not to provide enough information to make an acquisition-based 
decision, rather to make a decision to investigate a particular system further, or to begin 
work on prototypes. The fifth assumption was that the five MOEs identified by the authors 
are sufficient to evaluate unmanned and autonomous systems for the Marine Corps’ needs. 
Input from Dr. Matthew Johnson’s work on interdependence, the Marine Corps Operating 
Concept and the Marine Corps Rapid Capability Office informed the selection of these 
MOEs. Finally, the assumption that size, weight, and power (SWaP) was not appropriate 
to include in the ordinal evaluation of systems. SWaP was identified as difficult to compare 
among systems due to the different levels in which the systems would operate (tactical 
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versus operational). SWaP is still critical to the evaluation of the systems, and will be 
included through a nominal evaluation. 
C. ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
In accordance with the Marine Corps Operating Concept, Marine Corps Rapid 
Capability Office, and Dr. Johnson’s study on interdependence; the authors formulated five 
MOEs listed in Section D. The authors determined that these MOEs were critical in 
evaluating the effectiveness of systems. In order to rank these systems, the authors used an 
ordinal analysis in regards to the MOEs. Based upon the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) 
developed by Rice et al. (2015), the authors included a nominal analysis of SWaP. These 
characteristics may be important to the Marine Corps when determining which system to 
field for a unit of a certain size.   
1. Ordinal Rankings 
Ordinal data uses numbers to indicate superiority and ranking (Pariseau & Oswalt, 
1995). The ordinal number indicates the place in which the item stands in an ordered 
sequence and indicates relative rank within a data set (Pariseau & Oswalt, 1995). The 
authors used ordinal rankings while rating the five MOEs. The highest number indicates 
the most superior system within the ordinal data. For the evaluation of this study each MOE 
was assigned scoring criteria, between three and nine depending on the MOE. After ranking 
each system by MOE, the numbers assigned to that system will be combined in order to 
present an overall ordinal ranking. 
2. Weighting Methodology 
Based on the recommendations of MCWL, the authors developed a weighting 
methodology based on the research conducted for this thesis. The authors focused on the 
MOC as well as input from engineers at MCWL to determine the order of precedence for 
the MOEs.        
Mission capability was determined to be the most critical MOE and assigned a 
weight of five. Interdependence and modularity were the next most important MOEs, and 
each received a weight of four. Security ranked fourth out of the five MOEs and received 
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a weight of three. Technology readiness levels (TRLs) were ranked as the least important 
and received a weight of one.  
When applying the weighting factor, each platform first received a score based on 
the MOE tables in this chapter. This numeric value was then multiplied by the assigned 
weighting factor. For example, if a platform received a score of three in interdependence, 
it would then be multiplied by a weighting factor of four and achieve a final score in this 
category of 12. After applying weighting factors, the total number of points across the five 
MOEs were added together to determine the total score for each platform. The minimum 
total score any platform could receive was 17. The highest total score any platform could 
receive was 92.    
3. Nominal Category 
Nominal data relates to data that is given a name or label (Pariseau & Oswalt, 1995). 
This data may be counted; however, there is no order of precedence, or superiority 
associated with the numerical data. It is not possible to use arithmetic to manipulate the 
data in order to affect the model. Nominal data is useful in the categorization of data 
(Pariseau & Oswalt, 1995), which is why the authors used it to categorize the unit size that 
a certain system could support based upon the SWaP characteristics. See Table 7  for the 
list of possible nominal rankings. A system may be categorized into more than one group. 
The nominal category is included in every Effectiveness Analysis Table, see Table 1 for 
an example. 
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Mission Tasks 
Mission tasks (MTs) are normally pulled from the Initial Capabilities Document 
(ICD), or the Capabilities Development Document during the acquisitions process 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2017). However, UTACC is not a program of record and 
therefore does not require either of these documents. Through discussions with MCWL 
and the authors’ advisors, two mission tasks were selected for this thesis: local security and 
targeting. The authors viewed the two MTs from a tactical and operational perspective, 
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increasing the number of viable systems that could be evaluated. Each MT has specific 
measures of effectiveness that allowed the authors to evaluate the systems against one 
another and provide the ordinal ranking found in Chapter IV.      
2. Measures of Effectiveness 
MOEs are “…qualitative, or quantitative measure of a system’s performance, or 
characteristic that indicates the degree to which it performs the task, or meets a requirement 
under specified conditions” (Air Force Materiel Command, Office of Aerospace Studies, 
2010, p. 9). The authors chose five MOEs to evaluate the individual systems. These 
measures covered five areas: technology maturity, mission capability, interdependence, 
modularity, and security.  
a. MOE 1: Technology Readiness Level 
MOE 1 concerns the overall maturity of the technology involved with all aspects 
of a system. This MOE uses the nine Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) previously 
mentioned. MOE 1 is the current system technology readiness level.  
b. MOE 2: Mission Capability 
MOE 2 concerns the ability of a system to complete the overall mission task and 
determine the level of human involvement. This MOE relied on the Universal Naval Task 
List to determine levels of mission capability based on the subtasks. MOE 2 is the system’s 
ability to complete the assigned mission task with an appropriate level of human 
involvement.  
The authors broke down the three subtasks in local security identified in Chapter II 
into four subtasks to delineate between capabilities. Navy Tactical Task (NTA) 6.1 and 6.2 
remained as defined by the Universal Naval Task List. The authors broke NTA 6.3, Provide 
Security for Operational Forces and Means, into two subtasks. NTA 6.3.1, is designed to 
enhance freedom of action through a focus on the identification of friendly vulnerabilities 
to hostile acts. NTA 6.3.2, is designed to enhance freedom of action through a focus on 
reducing friendly vulnerabilities to hostile acts. The critical difference between these two 
subtasks is the ability to detect vulnerabilities versus the ability to reduce vulnerabilities. 
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The authors determined that this difference was significant when looking at platforms that 
have different capabilities, such as a platform capable of conducting only intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and a platform capable of conducting ISR and 
interdicting enemy forces, or establishing a defensive posture. The six subtasks associated 
targeting, MCT 3.1.1–3.1.6, remain unchanged for the evaluation of the systems. The 
authors evaluated systems in this MOE based on their ability to complete any combination 
of the ten total subtasks that make up both NTA 6.3 and MCT 3.1.    
c. MOE 3: Interdependence  
MOE 3 concerns a system’s ability to participate in joint activities, as identified in 
Chapter II, with other systems and/or humans in an interdependent manner. This MOE 
relied on the three levels of interdependence defined previously: pooled, sequential, and 
reciprocal. MOE 3 is the system’s ability to recognize that there are opportunities for 
higher levels of effectiveness and efficiency, and to act upon these opportunities.   
d. MOE 4: Modularity 
MOE 4 concerns a system’s ability to change out payloads for different mission 
tasks, mission requirements, or changing environments. This MOE referenced the ability 
to change mission configurations through common modules. Common modules simply 
refer to any payload/sensor that is not specific to one manufacturing company. MOE 4 is 
the system’s ability to change payload and/or sensors with minimal operational impact. 
e. MOE 5: Security 
MOE 5 concerns a system’s ability to operate securely in a contested environment. 
It relied on an analysis based on all three tenets of the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability (CIA) triad identified in Chapter II. During evaluation systems were evaluated 
based upon the current encryption built into the platform. For example, a system that 
utilizes a higher level of encryption (AES 256) receives a higher score than a system in 
which no encryption was built in. MOE 5 is the system’s ability to provide confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the system’s data at rest, in transit, and in use.       
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3. Effectiveness Analysis 
The authors inserted the MTs and MOEs into the rows of an Excel spreadsheet, 
while the alternatives were inserted into the columns. Below the alternatives, the nominal 
analysis results are provided in regards to the supportable unit size. The alternatives were 
then analyzed by MOE, in accordance with Table 2  through Table 6.  After completion of 
the Effectiveness Analysis, each alternative was multiplied by the weighting factor in order 
to determine overall MOE accomplishment. A score of 92 was the highest possible score, 
while a score of 17 was the lowest possible score based upon the criteria shown in Table 2 
through Table 6. The final column showed results and contained the ordinal analysis of 
every alternative. Table 1 gives an example effectiveness analysis, similar to the actual 
results found in Chapter IV.  






















Table 2.   Technology readiness level measures of effectiveness. Source: 
Defense Acquisition University (2017). 
 MOE 1: Technology Readiness Levels 
1 Basic principles observed and reported. 
2 Technology concept and/or application formulated. 
3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of 
concept. 
4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment. 
5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment 
6 System/subsystem model, or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment. 
7 System prototype demonstration in an operational environment. 
8 Actual system completed and qualified through test and demonstration. 




Table 3.   Mission capability measures of effectiveness 
 MOE 2: Mission Capability 
1 System can complete 10% of the subtasks of NTA 6 and MCT 3.1 
2 System can complete 20% of the subtasks of NTA 6 and MCT 3.1 
3 System can complete 30% of the subtasks of NTA 6 and MCT 3.1 
4 System can complete 40% of the subtasks of NTA 6 and MCT 3.1 
5 System can complete 50% of the subtasks of NTA 6 and MCT 3.1 
6 System can complete 60% of the subtasks of NTA 6 and MCT 3.1 
7 System can complete 70% of the subtasks of NTA 6 and MCT 3.1 
8 System can complete 80% of the subtasks of NTA 6 and MCT 3.1 
9 System can complete 90% of the subtasks of NTA 6 and MCT 3.1 
10 System can complete 100% of the subtasks of NTA 6 and MCT 3.1 
 
Table 4.   Interdependence measures of effectiveness 
MOE 3: Interdependence 
1 Pooled interdependence -  System can only receive direction from the human 
operator. There is no bidirectional sharing of information, or tasks during the 
mission. 
2 Sequential interdependence -  The system can receive direction from the human 
operator and provide information/direction in return during the mission.  
3 Reciprocal interdependence -  The system and human can both send and receive 
directions from each other throughout the entirety of the mission. The system 
and human operator can dynamically change mission, or task.  
 
Table 5.   Modularity measures of effectiveness 
MOE 4: Modularity 
1 No changes possible to payload/sensor modules. 
2 Accepts changes in modules from the sourcing company only. 





Table 6.   Security measures of effectiveness. Adapted from Harvey and 
Trevino (2018). 
MOE 5: Security 
1 C – Data is not encrypted while at rest, or in transit.  
I – No credentials required for access controls.  
A - No redundant communications and no less than 90% reliability in up time.  
2 C – Data is encrypted while in transit only.  
I – Single factor authentication required for access controls. 
A - Redundant communications and no less than 99% reliability in up time.  
3 C – Data is encrypted while at rest and in transit.  
I – Dual factor authentication required for access controls.  
A - Redundant communications, no less than 99.999% reliability in up time.  
Table 7.   Marine Corps supportable units 
Unit Nominal Identifier 





Expeditionary Advanced Base E 
 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter developed the systematic process used to evaluate the UAVs and 
UGVs. The five MOEs and SWaP characteristics provide a holistic view of the systems 
under consideration and should allow the Marine Corps to make an informed decision on 
how to apply resources and time. Chapter IV includes the results of this process and 





IV. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
This chapter provides the results of the evaluation of 51 UxVs, including 46 UAVs.  
First, the ordinal results for UAVs and UGVs is presented.  Next, the top 10 UAVs and all 
five UGVs are described in detail to provide the readers with an understanding as to why 
these systems were considered top performers. 
A. ORDINAL ANALYSIS 
This section lists the top ten platforms based on the weighted scores assigned by 
the authors. It also includes the nominal information showing what sized units the 
platforms would support. The next section will provide a written explanation of the systems 
and their capabilities, as well as a more detailed view of the scores assigned to each 
platform. Table 8 and Table 9 detail the top results from the effectiveness analyses that 
were conducted for both unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles 
(UGVs). The entirety of the results are listed in Appendix A. Summary of Results.  
Table 8.   UAVs  




Aeryon, SkyRanger R60/R80 82 S 
Tekever,AR4 Light Ray  78 S 
Shield AI, Hivemind Nova 75 F 
AiroVironment, SwitchBlade 74 S 
AceCore Technologies, NEO 73 C 
AceCore Technologies, ZOE 73 C 
Leptron Avenger 73 B 
Pulse Aerospace, Vapor 55 73 B 
Silent Falcon UAS Tech, Silent 
Falcon 
73 B 
Schiebel, CAMCOPTER® S-100 70 B 
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Table 9.   UGVs  




Autonomous Solutions Inc, 
CHAOS 
72 P 
AION Robotics, Model M 66 C 
Milrem Robotics, Tracked Hybrid 
Modular Infantry System 
(THeMIS) 
56 C 
NXT Robotics, Scorpion 56 E 
Ghost Robotics, GR Vision 49 S 
 
B. ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 
This section is not an exhaustive explanation of each product (links for the 
associated websites can be found in Appendix A. Summary of Results), rather an overview 
of the evaluated system’s intent, general design, and weighted score based on the measures 
of effectiveness (MOEs) from Chapter III. The authors evaluated a total of 46 UAVs and 
five UGVs, and identified 10 UAVs and five UGVs that were most likely to be a quick win 
for the Marine Corps. Evaluation of these systems follow in the next section.  
1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
a. SkyRanger R80, Aeryon 
The SkyRanger R80 platform is a man packable quadcopter UAV that is capable 
of a wide set of missions including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance/ 
reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition (ISR/RSTA) missions (Aeryon, n.d.). This 
system is secure, rugged, and proven in operational environments.  Using NVIDIA TX2 
processors, the R80 is at the leading edge of object detection and classification. It is capable 
of Automatic In-Air Replacement, where a ready to launch system will take off 
automatically to switch with an UAV with a low battery. Four batteries rated under 99 Wh 
power the R80 which measures 31”x31”x26” and weighs 9.9 lbs. These batteries provide 
a flight time of 50 minutes. A tether system is available in order to provide continuous 
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flight time for missions such as over-watch, or surveillance. The R80 is highly modular 
and accommodates payloads up to 4.4lbs, making it highly versatile and able to adapt to 
the necessary mission. This platform would best support squad-sized units and up. Figure 
7 is a photo of this system and Table 10 is the effectiveness analysis for it.  
 
Figure 7.  SkyRanger R80. Source: Aeryon (n.d.). 

















9 8 3 3 3 82 S https://www.aeryon.com 
 
b. AR4 Light Ray, Tekever  
The AR4 Light Ray by Tekever is a fixed wing mini-UAV is suitable for ISR/RSTA 
missions (Tekever, n.d.). This system is easy to use, transport and maintain while being 
highly versatile due to its payload flexibility. The AR4 Light Ray has been used by both 
security and military forces, and can detect, identify and track capabilities. It measures 
71”x47” and weighs 11 lbs. Users hand-launch the AR 4 Light Ray and retrieve it via 
parachute. The AR4 has a flight time of up to two hours. It is highly modular and gives the 
user the ability to quickly alternate payloads up to 2.2 lbs. This platform would best support 
squad-sized units and up. Figure 8 is a photo of this system and Table 11 is the effectiveness 




Figure 8.  AR4 Light Ray. Source: Tekever (n.d.). 

















9 8 2 3 3 78 S http://airray.tekever.com 
 
c. Hivemind NOVA, Shield AI 
The Hivemind NOVA is a quadcopter based platform that has unique software that 
allows it to explore urban environments, including buildings, with minimal input from 
operators (Shield AI, n.d.). Various agencies in the DoD are testing the system. Shield AI 
has been in contact with the Marine Corps Rapid Capability Office (MCRCO). The 
Hivemind framework enables the NOVA to learn from real and synthetic experiences, 
allowing it to conduct a wide array of missions with minimal user input (Shield AI, n.d.). 
It is capable of autonomous exploration, while providing live streaming and map 
generation. Hivemind NOVA is 16.5”x16.5”x10.5”, weighs 2.75 lbs and is powered by 
6,000 mAH li-Ion battery. It has a flight time of 12 minutes, with easily swappable battery 
packs. This platform would best support fire team-sized units and up. Figure 9 is a photo 




Figure 9.  Hivemind Nova. Source: Shield AI (n.d.). 
















6 8 3 2 3 75 F https://www.shield.ai 
 
d. Switchblade, AiroVironment 
AiroVironment, DoD trusted source, manufactures the Switchblade. It is a back-
packable UAV capable of conducting beyond line of sight strikes (AiroVironment, n.d.). 
It is tube launched from a self-contained ground launcher, which fits in a pack and is 
capable of ISR/RSTA and precision strikes. This scalable unit weighs 5.5 lbs with an 
endurance of 15 minutes. It has modular payloads allowing for mission flexibility, and 
small visual, thermal, and acoustic signatures (AiroVironment, n.d.). This platform would 
best support squad-sized units and up. Figure 10 is a photo of this system and Table 13 is 
the effectiveness analysis for it.        
 
Figure 10.  Switchblade. Source: AiroVironment: SwitchBlade (n.d.). 
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9 8 1 3 3 74 S http://www.avinc.com 
 
e. Neo, AceCore Technologies 
The Neo has eight electric motors that provide it with stability and precision in 
adverse weather conditions (AceCore Technologies, n.d.). This platform and the Zoe which 
is also manufactured by AceCore Technologies, have been used extensively in the film 
industry providing a reliable track record for their remote sensing capabilities (AceCore 
Technologies, n.d.). It is a modular system, with multiple locations in which payloads may 
be mounted quickly in order to configure for multiple missions. Neo is 44”x 44”x25,” 
weighs 15.96 lbs and is powered by two 22,000 mAH Lithium Polymer batteries. It has a 
flight time of 30 minutes and is capable of carrying payloads with a total weight of 19.84 
lbs. This platform would best support company-sized units and up. Figure 11 is a photo of 
this system and Table 14 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
    
Figure 11.  Neo. Source: AceCore Technologies (n.d.). 
















8 8 1 3 3 73 C https://www.acecoretechnologies.com 
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f. Zoe, AceCore Technologies 
The Zoe is a different design than the Neo, although both are manufactured by 
AceCore Technologies. Smaller than the Neo, the Zoe is foldable and can be deployed in 
minutes, and also has a proven record within the film industry (AceCore Technologies, 
n.d.). It is a modular system, with multiple locations in which payloads may be quickly 
mounted in to be configured for multiple missions. Zoe is 28”x 28”x18”, weighs 8.58 lbs 
and is powered by two 16,000 mAH Lithium Polymer batteries. It has a flight time of 40 
minutes and is capable of carrying payloads with a total weight of 14.33 lbs. This platform 
would best support company-sized units and up. Figure 12 is a photo of this system and 
Table 15 is the effectiveness analysis for it.     
 
Figure 12.  Zoe. Source: AceCore Technologies (n.d.). 






















g. Avenger, Leptron 
The Avenger is a high-performance helicopter UAV capable of supporting a wide 
range of sensor suites in order to fulfill multiple missions (Leptron Avenger, n.d.). The 
platform has been proven in operational environments and has a simple user interface that 
is capable of low altitude surveillance, photography, and sensor deployment (Leptron 
Avenger, n.d.). It measures 75”x58” and is can carry up to a 10 lbs payload. It has two 
power configurations; a battery operation that provides no power loss and quiet operation 
with flight time of 20 minutes, and a fuel engine which increases flight time to two hours. 
This platform would best support battalion-sized units and up. Figure 13 is a photo of this 
system and Table 16 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 13.  Avenger. Source: Leptron Avenger (n.d.). 






















h. Vapor 55, Pulse Aerospace 
The Vapor 55 is a helicopter UAV with a gross weight of 53 lbs, a payload weight 
of over 30 lbs and over one hour of flight time (Pulse Aerospace, n.d.). The Vapor 55 uses 
a modular approach to its sensor suite, supporting any sensor the customer needs so long 
as it conforms to the size and weight restrictions. An advanced flight control system allows 
mission planning through an easy-to-use interface (Pulse Aerospace, n.d.). This platform 
has the capability to perform joint tasks with other Vapor 55 platforms to jointly lift 
external payloads. Currently, the special operations community is using this platform in 
the operational environment, providing the Vapor 55 with a proven track record. The 
capability to incorporate nearly any payload that is under 30 lbs into a vertical take-off and 
landing (VTOL) airframe with a one-hour flight time makes this platform well suited for 
local security and targeting. This platform would best support battalion-sized units and up. 
Figure 14 is a photo of this system and Table 17 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 14.  Vapor 55. Source: Pulse Aerospace (n.d.). 





















i. Silent Falcon, Silent Falcon UAS Tech 
The Silent Falcon is a fixed wing, solar powered UAV allowing five hours of flight 
time (Silent Falcon, n.d.). A modular payload design allows the Silent Falcon to carry any 
number of sensors and payloads (Silent Falcon, n.d.). The highly efficient and electric 
propulsion is quiet enough to avoid detection by the human ear at 100 meters (Silent 
Falcon, n.d.). The Silent Falcon has a 4.4 meter wingspan, a length of 1.9 meters, and 
weighs only 32 lbs (Silent Falcon, n.d.). Users can launch it via catapult and it currently 
lands via a repack-able parachute; a belly landing version is under development (Silent 
Falcon, n.d.). Requiring only 30 minutes to setup and launch, this platform would best 
support battalion-sized units and up. Figure 15 is a photo of this system and Table 18 is the 
effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 15.  Silent Falcon. Source: Silent Falcon (n.d.). 






















j. CAMCOPTER S-100, Schiebel 
The CAMCOPTER S-100 is a helicopter based design that can operate in virtually 
any environment, streaming live, high-definition video back to the users (Schiebel 
CAMPCOPTER S-100,n.d.). The S-100 navigates via GPS waypoints and preplanned 
missions are configured through a graphical user interface (Schiebel CAMPCOPTER S-
100,n.d.). The maximum dimensions for the S-100 are 122”x49”x44” with an empty 
weight of 243 lbs (Schiebel CAMPCOPTER S-100,n.d.). A robust sensor suite that 
includes “electric-optical/infra-red (EO/IR), synthetic aperture radar (SAR), maritime 
radar, ground penetrating radar (GPSAR), signal intelligence (SIGINT), communication 
intelligence (COMINT), and light detection, and ranging (LIDAR)” coupled with a six 
hour flight endurance make this platform very capable (Schiebel CAMPCOPTER S-
100,n.d.). The ability to share information between this platform and other platforms brings 
a higher level of interdependence to the S-100. This platform would best support battalion-
sized units and up. Figure 16 is a photo of this system and Table 19 is the effectiveness 
analysis for it. 
 
Figure 16.  CAMCOPTER S-100. Source: Schiebel CAMPCOPTER S-100 (n.d.). 





















2. Unmanned Ground Vehicles  
a. CHAOS, Autonomous Solutions Inc 
CHAOS uses four independent tracks to execute what the manufacturer calls a 
swimming motion, allowing the robot to traverse a variety of challenging environments  
(Autonomous Solutions Inc, n.d.). CHAOS is can carry up to 275 lbs, which allows the 
system to complete a majority of the mission tasks outlined in Chapter III. CHAOS also 
has basic mission planning capabilities, allowing it to move supplies to destinations, or 
conduct surveillance of areas. It has a top speed of 6.5 mph and can conduct operations on 
a single battery for up to eight hours (Autonomous Solutions Inc, n.d.). At 51.6” long, 26.2” 
wide and 153 lbs, this platform would best support company-sized units and up 
(Autonomous Solutions Inc, n.d.). Figure 17 is a photo of this system and Table 20 is the 
effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 17.  CHAOS. Source: Autonomous Solutions Inc (n.d.). 






















b. Model M, AION Robotics 
The Model M series is a commercial grade UGV using a four wheel configuration 
(six wheel configuration available) that can perform a wide variety of tasks to include site 
security, physical inspection, and search and rescue (AION Robotics, n.d.). This is a 
smaller UGV with measurements  of 22”x24”x10,” and a weight of just over 30 lbs (AION 
Robotics, n.d.). The battery provides 10 hours of continuous run-time, making it suitable 
for multiple mission tasks. The company stated that this platform can be scaled to fit the 
customer’s requirements. This platform would best support company-sized units and up. 
Figure 18 is a photo of this system and Table 21 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 18.  Model M. Source: AION Robotics (n.d.). 






















c. Tracked Hybrid Modular Infantry System (THeMIS), Milrem Robotics 
The Tracked Hybrid Modular Infantry System (THeMIS), is a highly modular UGV 
that can support a wide range of mission tasks at varying levels of organizational size  
(Milrem Robotics, n.d.). The platform is powered by a hybrid electric-diesel drive and 
measures 94”x84”x44” (Milrem Robotics, n.d.). With a gross weight of 3,200 lbs, THeMIS 
can carry a maximum payload of 1,650 lbs for a duration of eight to ten hours (Milrem 
Robotics, n.d.). It can be outfitted to carry large payloads for resupply, various sensors for 
targeting, or weapons for remote operation. The THeMIS can be used in a basic 
teleoperation mode, a “follow me” mode, waypoint, or basic mission planning mode, or as 
a part of a swarm, according to the manufacturer (Milrem Robotics, n.d.). This platform 
would best support company-sized units and up. Figure 19 is a photo of this system and 
Table 22 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 19.  THeMIS. Source: Milrem Robotics (n.d.). 






















d. Scorpion, NXT Robotics 
The Scorpion is a rugged all-terrain and all-weather UGV designed to provide 
physical security monitoring and reporting capabilities (NXT Robotics, n.d.). Proximity 
sensors, pressure sensors, optical sensors, environment monitors, and motion sensors 
enable the scorpion to proactively monitor physical areas (NXT Robotics, n.d.). The 
platform uses artificial intelligence to determine better routes and have more effective 
interactions with other UxVs and humans (NXT Robotics, n.d.). The Scorpion also uses 
GPS and LIDAR for navigation, circumnavigation and collision avoidance (NXT Robotics, 
n.d.). It can monitor for acoustics such as gun shots, or vehicle engines during autonomous 
missions (NXT Robotics, n.d.). It uses a gasoline engine and can carry a payload of 250 
lbs, making this system best to support advanced expeditionary bases. Figure 20 is a photo 
of this system and Table 23 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 20.  Scorpion. Source: NXT Robotics (n.d.). 






















e. GR Vision, Ghost Robotics 
The GR Vision is a legged UGV designed for military and public safety use (Ghost 
Robotics, n.d.). The overall intent of the GR Vision is to provide a low cost, high 
endurance, and scalable (one to four feet in length) UGV that can operate in most 
environments while providing security capabilities (Ghost Robotics, n.d.). These scalable 
systems are still being prototyped, and do not have exact specifications provided. However, 
Ghost Robotics’ intent is to design platforms that meet the customer’s requirements and 
would be considered expendable due to their low cost. The GR Vision will soon integrate 
software from a Philadelphia based company, Exyn, that would allow the platform to 
navigate independently and react to new challenges in the environment. Based on the 
authors’ interaction with Exyn, and the demonstration of its software at AUVSI 
Exponential 2018, the GR Vision would become exponentially more capable once the new 
software is integrated. This platform would best support squad-sized units and up. Figure 
21 is a photo of this system and Table 24 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 21.  GR Vision. Source: Ghost Robotics (n.d.). 





















C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the results of the authors’ research into and evaluation of 51 
UxVs. The authors could only identify five UGVs likely to be quick wins and also 
previously unidentified by the Marine Corps. Chapter V discusses the likely reasons for 
this outcome. Chapter V also discusses platforms that did not make the top 10 list of UAVs, 








V. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis identified unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground 
vehicles (UGVs) that could fulfill the mission tasks of local security and targeting. This 
chapter outlines recommendations for UAVs and UGVs that will fulfill the needs of the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC). It covers platforms that can be deployed 
immediately, unique platforms that did not score well but are noteworthy and concept 
systems that need to be revaluated in the future.   
A. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to ensure that the needs of the Marine Corps are being met, a constant 
evaluation of the state of UAVs and UGVs must be conducted. A comprehensive list of all 
UAVs and UGVs that the authors identified may be found in Appendix A and Appendix 
B. Recommendations for operational implementation, noteworthy platforms and platforms 
suited for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) are as follows.  
1. UAVs 
The following sections are the authors’ recommendations for which UAVs should 
be implemented, investigated further, and further developed. 
a. Operational Implementation  
 The authors evaluated multiple UAVs that possess the capabilities and readiness 
necessary to be immediately deployed by the Marine Corps in support of targeting and 
local security missions. MCWL originally identified four mission tasks.  The authors, after 
consulting with thesis advisors, narrowed the scope of the thesis to local security and 
targeting in order to conduct a more in-depth analysis. While supporting different sized 
units, all platforms found in Chapter IV can be deployed immediately. Of those in Chapter 
IV, Skyranger R80, AR4 Light Ray, Hivemind NOVA and Switchblade are the most 
relevant, capable, and mission ready. 
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The authors identified the Switchblade and AR4 Light Ray as the two most capable 
platforms for targeting.  The Switchblade has the capability to locate and engage targets 
while operating BLOS.  The AR4 Light Ray’s small size and ability to intelligently detect 
human targets at long ranges help it stand out as a top performer in the targeting mission.  
For a more detailed description of these systems, see Chapter IV. 
The authors identified the Skyranger R80 and the Hivemind NOVA as the two most 
capable platforms for local security.  The Hivemind NOVA’s small size and intelligent 
capabilities make it well positioned to conduct local security missions.  The Skyranger 
R80’s unique abilities to operate from a vehicle and interchange with other UAVs while in 
flight also make it well positioned to conduct local security missions.  For a more detailed 
description of these systems, see Chapter IV.  
b. Noteworthy Platforms 
Although they did not score within the top ten platforms, the following UAVs were 
deemed noteworthy by the authors. Some of these platforms provide unique capabilities 
that could be easily be modified to better fulfill the needs of the Marine Corps. 
(1) Jump 20, Arcturus UAV 
The Jump 20 is a vertical takeoff, and landing (VTOL) fixed wing UAV designed 
and built by Arcturus UAV (Arcturus UAV, n.d.). This platform is capable of 9- to 16-hour 
endurance and has a modular design. It can carry up to 60 lbs of fuel and useable payload, 
making it highly versatile. The dimensions are 18’6”x9’5” and is powered by a 4 stroke 
MOGAS engine. This platform would best support a battalion-sized unit and up. Figure 22 




Figure 22.  Jump 20. Source: Arcturus UAV (n.d.). 
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(2) Orion, ElistAir 
The Orion is a six engine tethered drone that can be employed from a vehicle 
(ElistAir, n.d.). Designed specifically for military and security use, this system can detect 
humans out to 10 kilometers and can be untethered to gain better situational awareness on 
a target area (ElistAir, n.d.). This platform is highly modular and fits into one pelican case 
when broken down. This platform would best support a company-sized unit and up. Figure 
23 is a photo of this system and Table 26 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 23.  Orion. Source: ElistAir (n.d.). 
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Table 26.   Orion evaluation 
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(3) S2, Black Swift Technologies, LLC 
Designed for scientific research in adverse atmospheric conditions, the S2 can fly 
more than one and a half hours and reach a ceiling height of 14,000 feet (Black Swift 
Technologies, n.d.). Operators can hand launch this UAV, which can carry a number of 
different sensors (Black Swift Technologies, n.d.). The S2 measures 68”x47”, weighs 6 lbs 
and is powered by an 8000mAh LiPo battery capable of powering one hour of flight time. 
This platform would best support a company-sized unit and up. Figure 24 is a photo of this 
system and Table 27 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 24.  Black Swift S2. Source: Black Swift Technologies (n.d.). 
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(4) Shearwater, Planck Aerosystems 
The Shearwater is a quadcopter designed UAV that is operated in conjunction with 
moving vehicles, or ships (Planck Aerosystems, n.d.). This system can provide over watch 
as vehicles conduct operations, track enemy targets, or act as a communications antenna. 
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This platform launches and lands automatically based on a simple interface from which 
operators can plan missions. It is highly portable and comes with a traveling case. This 
platform would best support a company-sized unit and up. Figure 25 is a photo of this 
system and Table 28 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 25.  Shearwater. Source: Planck Aerosystems (n.d.). 
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(5) Nightingale Security, Unmanned Aerial Specialists 
Designed for industrial security solutions, the Nightingale Security UAV can 
respond to alarm events, or conduct preplanned security patrols (Nightingale Security, 
n.d.). This platform can conduct full missions, land, recharge, and continue conducting 
missions with no physical human intervention (Nightingale Security, n.d.). The system is 
37”x33”x11,” can fly up to 40 minutes, while taking 45 minutes to recharge. This platform 
would best support a company-sized unit and up. Figure 26 is a photo of this system and 




Figure 26.  Nightingale Security. Source: Nightingale Security (n.d.). 
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(6) Navig8 Electric, 4 Front Robotics 
The Navig8 Electric is a two engine UAV that can conduct flight operations in 
confined spaces such as buildings, or subterranean structures (4 Front Robotics, n.d.). This 
platform has unique capabilities to take off and land at sloped angles and has a large 
payload capacity of up to 10 lbs. The platform measures 123”x86”x28” and can carry 
payloads up to 70 lbs. When powered by gas, it has a 150-minute flight time, when powered 
by battery, it utilizes Lithium Ion batteries and has a flight time of 50 minutes. This 
platform would best support a battalion-sized unit and up. Figure 27 is a photo of this 
system and Table 30 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 27.  Navig8 Electric. Source: 4 Front Robotics (n.d.). 
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c. RDT&E 
The following platforms are not yet mature, but have the potential to fulfill targeting 
and local security missions in the future. These systems would benefit from the RDT&E 
process. 
(1) Elroy Air 
This platform is a rotor-based VTOL UAV, while using fixed wing cruise flight for 
traveling (Elroy Air, n.d.). Designed as a logistics platform first, Elroy Air can carry 
150 lbs, 300 miles. This platform also has the ability to integrate payloads at the user’s 
request which can support ISR missions. Figure 28 is a photo of this system and Table 31 
is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 28.  Elroy Air. Source: Elroy Air (n.d.). 




















(2) Advanced Aircraft Co, Hybrid Advanced Multi-Rotor (HAMR) 
HAMR is a Multi-Rotor VTOL with a flight time similar to that of a fixed wing 
UAV. This platform has a flight time of 3.5 hours and can carry a payload of up to 7 lbs. 
Primarily powered by gasoline, but it also has battery power in order to provide a fail-safe 
power supply. It has multiple payload bays. Figure 29 is a photo of this system and Table 
32 is the effectiveness analysis for it. 
 
Figure 29.  Hybrid Advanced Multi-Rotor. Source: Advanced Aircraft 
Company (n.d.). 
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2. UGVs 
In the authors opinion, that state of UGVs is significantly behind that of UAVs; a 
large gap in quality, quantity, and capability was noted while analyzing these platforms. 
While collecting data on UGVs a lack of relevant platforms became apparent.  The demand 
for such systems has been low, mainly because of the restrictive nature over ground.  Due 
to this difficulty, fewer systems have been produced, while a majority of funding and 
research focuses on UAVs.  The DARPA Grand Challenges further demonstrate the 
difficulty in solving the biggest issues (mobility and SWaP) associated with UGVs (Darter, 
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2004). The authors believe that there is a benefit from having a UGV on the ground with 
Marine Corps’ units, however, it will be necessary to further analyze and develop what is 
on the market before decisions are made. Of the systems evaluated by the authors, CHAOS, 
Model M, Tracked Hybrid Modular Infantry Systems, and Scorpion are ready to implement 
operationally. The GR Vision would benefit from additional RDT&E and has the highest 
upside of platforms identified during this thesis. 
B. FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES 
1. System Designs 
The authors’ attendance at the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems 
International (AUVSI) Exponential 2018 revealed the commercial industry’s focus for 
future platform designs and capabilities. Two concepts dominated the conference. First, 
companies that had multiple platforms typically had at least one VTOL version, or were in 
the process of developing one. Both large and small platforms generally adhered to this 
rule of thumb. Additionally, these companies’ focus for their next iteration of their 
platforms was towards increasing payload capacity and modularity of sensors. 
Second, companies appear to be addressing a growing interest in the capability of 
tethering existing UAV platforms to ground control stations. Many companies identified 
at the conference were offering this capability. The tethering capability adds several 
important capabilities to existing systems that the Marine Corps could find useful. The 
tether provides a data link from the UAV’s sensors to the ground station, increasing the 
security of that information. Additionally, a tethered UAV can provide persistent 
surveillance if powered by the ground control station. The authors see this as an important 
capability in achieving local security in many scenarios, specifically in Expeditionary 
Advanced Bases (EABs).            
2. Subsystem Advances 
The authors’ research into different unmanned vehicles (UxVs) revealed great 
advances into some of the technologies that will power highly interdependent systems 
going forward. While these technologies have great potential moving forward, they 
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currently have a small presence in the commercial industry. Two primarily software 
companies, Exyn Technologies and Shield AI, have developed two examples that the 
authors identified. Chapter IV has the evaluation for Shield AI’s Hivemind Nova. Exyn 
Technologies’ software is not currently in any of the evaluated UxVs. However, Ghost 
Robotics’ GR Vision will incorporate Exyn’s software before the end of calendar year 
2018. Both of these software-based capabilities are on the leading edge of the industry as 
identified by the authors and warrant additional consideration by the Marine Corps.      
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This section will cover five areas that the authors deemed important and in need of 
further research: future of airspace deconfliction, Universal Urgent Needs Statement 
(UUNS) sponsorship, continued technology scouting, three types of machine learning: 
edge, collective, and external, and acquisition requirements for unmanned systems.   
1. Future of Airspace Deconfliction  
As the Marine Corps continues to add UAVs to the fleet in large numbers (currently 
down to every rifle squad), airspace deconfliction will need to be readdressed. Besides the 
large influx in the number of UAVs, the types of commanders who own these aircraft are 
beginning to change as well. Where the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) previously 
owned the majority of aircraft, the Ground Combat Element (GCE), and Logistics Combat 
Element (LCE) are beginning to own more aircraft organically. These factors begin to 
change the ways airspace must be deconflicted. Many possible solutions address the issue 
of an increasingly crowded and complex airspace. Two examples would be increasing the 
number of Marines dedicated to deconfliction or the use of software capabilities to enhance 
existing methods. 
The authors found the solutions offered by White Fox Defense Technologies to be 
an interesting starting point. Their solution primarily focuses on counter-UAVs with 
adaptability and scalability built in to the system (White Fox Defense Technologies, n.d.). 
The authors believe that this capability could be developed into a system capable of 
addressing friendly airspace control as well as countering neutral or enemy UAVs.    
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2. Universal Urgent Needs Statement Sponsorship 
The Universal Urgent Needs Statement (UUNS) provides “rapid acquisition of a 
capability in order to meet an urgent requirement” (Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
2006). This process could benefit from research conducted by students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS). While the long lead time required for a full thesis may not be 
compatible with the rapid acquisition of technologies, students could be assigned to 
different Combatant Commands to provide short information papers on different topics 
related to specific UUNS. This would provide two benefits to the combatant commanders. 
First, the commanders who submit UUNS would have access to Marine Corps officers who 
are dedicated to addressing a very specific technology problem in a short time frame. There 
would not be a formal process of submitting a statement of work, rather a question asked 
and answered. Second, the commanders would be connected with students who are in the 
education domain, as well as being co-located with many Silicon Valley companies who 
may be able to provide a solution to the UUNS.    
3. Continued Technology Scouting  
The authors believe that more students in the future should be assigned to identify 
quick-win systems. The research confirmed that many of the Marine Corps’ organizations 
designed to identify, develop, and field new systems are over-tasked and undermanned. 
This means that many capable platforms are identified too late or not at all. The students 
at NPS are well positioned to remain connected with technology companies in the region 
and can travel easily to conduct onsite visits and working groups. Students should also look 
into alternative sources for information such as citizenscience.gov, a site designed to solve 
governmental problems through public participation. The unmanned systems database 
sponsored by AUVSI is another example of an avenue to identifying unmanned platforms. 
The NPS library and Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and 
Research (CRUSER) have begun investigating options to purchase access to this database.   
4. Three Types of Machine Learning: Edge, Collective, External  
Shield AI has identified three types of machine learning that it employs to develop 
capabilities: edge, collective, and external (Shield AI, n.d.). Edge learning teaches 
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individual platforms, and focuses on improvements for doing tasks more efficiently and 
effectively (Shield AI, n.d.). Collective learning allows platforms working together to share 
information and learn from one another resulting in divisions of labor, specialized roles, 
and faster rates of task completion (Shield AI, n.d.). External learning focuses on how the 
systems interact and learn from elements in the operating environment, such as weather, or 
human interaction (Shield AI, n.d.).   
These concepts have a large crossover with the concept of interdependence and the 
authors believe these three machine learning types will be critical to evaluating future 
systems. Research should be done to identify successful instances of the three types of 
learning in the commercial sector. 
5. Acquisition Requirements for Unmanned Systems 
Unmanned systems are bringing new issues into the discussions concerning 
requirements definition in the acquisitions community. As mentioned in Chapter II, the use 
of levels of autonomy to determine what is required for an unmanned system to be fielded 
would be inadequate and inappropriate. The Marine Corps’ acquisition community should 
instead focus on the level of interdependence that is required. This thesis used three simple 
categories to differentiate between levels of interdependence. Additional research could 
determine an effective way to measure the interdependence of unmanned systems. The 
authors propose a study sponsored by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
(MCCDC) to determine the best approach to develop a consistent approach.   
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter recommended specific UAVs and UGVs that the Marine Corps should 
research further. This chapter also addressed several areas that should be researched in the 
future to address developing issues. Airspace deconfliction, sponsorship of UUNSs, 
continued technology scouting for quick-win systems and requirements for the future 








Company Name & Platform Total Score Nominal Information Website/Link
Aeryon, SkyRanger R60/R80 82 S https://www.aeryon.com
Tekever,AR4 Light Ray 78 S http://airray.tekever.com
Shield AI, Hivemind Nova 75 F https://www.shield.ai
AiroVironment, SwitchBlade 74 S http://www.avinc.com
AceCore Technologies, NEO 73 C https://www.acecoretechnologies.com
AceCore Technologies, ZOE 73 C https://www.acecoretechnologies.com
Leptron Avenger 73 B http://www.leptron.com
Pulse Aerospace, Vapor 55 73 B http://www.pulseaero.com
Silent Falcon UAS Tech, Silent Falcon 73 B http://www.silentfalconuas.com
Schiebel, CAMCOPTER® S-100 70 B https://schiebel.net
Arcturus UAV, Jump 20 68 B https://arcturus-uav.com
Black Swift Technologies, LLC, S1 68 B https://bst.aero
Black Swift Technologies, LLC, S2 68 C https://bst.aero
Tekever, AR3 Net ray 68 B http://airray.tekever.com
ElistAir, Orion 67 C http://elistair.com
Planck Aerosystems, Shearwater 65 C http://planckaero.com
UAVOS, Borey-10 63 B http://www.uavos.com
UAVOS, UVH-29E 63 B http://www.uavos.com
Reference Technologies, Hummingbird XRP 61 C http://www.referencetek.com
Unmanned Aerial Specialists, Nightingale Security 61 C http://www.ua-sp.com
Tekever, AR5 Life Ray 61 B http://airray.tekever.com
Delair, DT26M 60 C https://delair.aero
Trident World Systems, SparrowHawk 60 S http://www.tridentworldsystems.com
Leptron RDASS 60 C http://www.leptron.com
High Eye, HEF 32 VTOL 59 B https://www.higheye.com
ECA, Mini UAV (tethered) 58 C https://www.ecagroup.com
Elroy Air 58 B http://www.elroyair.com
CyPhy, Persistent Aerial Reconnaissance and Communications (PARC) 58 C https://www.cyphyworks.com
Black Peak Engineering, SA-200 Weasel 56 B http://www.blackpeakengineering.com
4 Front Robotics, Navig8 Electric 55 B https://www.4frontrobotics.com
DroneTechUAV, VMX8 Pelican 53 B http://www.dronetechuav.com
Advanced Aircraft Co, Hybrid Advanced Multi-Rotor (HAMR) 51 C http://www.advancedaircraftcompany.com
SunBirds, SB4 Phoenix 51 C https://www.sunbirds.aero
Latitude Engineering, HQ 10 50 C https://latitudeengineering.com
Latitude Engineering, HQ 40 50 B https://latitudeengineering.com
Latitude Engineering, HQ 55 50 B https://latitudeengineering.com
Latitude Engineering, HQ 90B 50 B https://latitudeengineering.com
C-Astral, Bramor PPX 50 C http://www.c-astral.com
Novadem, NX110m 49 S http://www.novadem.com
Fotokite, Fotokite Pro 47 F https://fotokite.com
XCRAFT, X2 Pro 47 S https://xcraft.io
Unmanned Aerial Specialists, Freebird One 42 B http://www.ua-sp.com
Digital Aerolus, aertos 121 38 S http://digitalaerolus.com
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APPENDIX B.  SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR UGVS 
 
  
Company Name & Platform Total Score Nominal Information Website/Link
Autonomous Solutions Inc, CHAOS 72 P
https://www.asirobots.com/platforms/chaos/
AION Robotics, Model M 66 C
www.aionrobotics.com
Milrem Robotics, Tracked Hybrid Modular Infantry System (THeMIS) 56 C
https://milremrobotics.com/
NXT Robotics, Scorpion 56 E
http://www.nxtrobotics.com/scorpion/
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